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Why has export diversification been so hard to achieve in Africa? 
Paul Mosley1 
 
1. Introduction 
                    Although the poorest countries, notably in Africa, have experienced some 
success during the twenty-first century in returning to growth, and in some cases reducing 
poverty also2, they have  with one solitary exception ( Vietnam) had no success at all in the 
present century in confronting the fundamental development problem which has afflicted 
them since colonial times: their inability to diversify their export base and become exporters 
of manufactures, a handicap which since has exposed them to adverse trends in the terms 
of trade, volatility of trade flows and inability to realise externalities from learning by doing 
from the production of high-technology goods (Lewis 1954, IMF 2014a). Indeed, some low-
income countries, especially in Africa, which achieved some penetration of global export 
markets during the 1990s, from Ghana to Zimbabwe (Table 1), have now lost their 
competitive edge and have been forced back into production for the domestic market only, 
thus trapping them in a vicious circle of increased costs and increased inability to compete 
or diversify.  
As shown by Table 1, inability to diversify is not a problem applying to all developing 
countries, indeed it is the developing countries of East Asia, and also Brazil, who have shown 
the way in escaping from it (World Bank 1993, etc). The problem applies rather to the 
poorest developing countries and specifically to Africa.  As shown in table 1, tŚĞ/D& ?Ɛ
estimate of the change in the export diversification index over the last fifty years3, although 
around 20% for the developing world as a whole and more than this for Asia and Latin 
America, is for Africa insignificantly different from zero (although there are a few countries 
which have managed very substantial diversification during this time, including South Africa 
and Mauritius).  Over the most recent period of the last twenty-five years, the recent book 
                                                          
1 Professor of Economics, University of Sheffield.  My thanks to Chris Milner, Salamat Ali, Roel Dom, Oliver 
Morrissey, Adrian WoŽĚĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐĂƚƚŚĞ ‘DŝůŶĞƌƐǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ ?ŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌŵŽƐƚǀĂůƵĂďůĞ
comments on the original version of this paper. Some of the material presented here draws on Chapters 6 and 
7 of my book Out of the poverty trap: fiscal policy and the natural resource curse (Mosley 2017) and I am 
grateful to Taylor and Francis Publishers for allowing me to make use of material first presented there. 
2 In Africa, we estimate that just under half of all countries for which we have data have achieved significant 
reduction in headcount poverty over the quarter-century since 1990. For discussion of why this is, see Khan et 
al. (2016) 
3 tĞƵƐĞƚŚĞ/D& ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚExport Diversification Database (IMF 2014b). This measure of 
diversification, in the woƌĚƐŽĨŽŶĞŽĨŝƚƐĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ? ‘ĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐĨŽƌĞŶĚŽŐĞŶĞŝƚǇƵƐŝŶŐ/sD ?/ŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂů
Variable Bayesian Model Averaging), a method specifically designed to allow for a potentially large set of 
ŐƌŽǁƚŚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚƐǁŚĞŶĐĂƵƐĂůŝƚǇŝƐĚƌĂǁŶŝŶƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ?/D& ? ? ? ?ď P4). The value of this index drops from 
a maximum of 10 to a minimum of zero as the level of export diversification rises. 
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by Whitfield et al (2016: 64) finds that the share of Africa in total manufacturing production, 
always minute, has fallen back further between 1980 and 2005, from 0.4 to 0.3 per cent 
 
Table 1. Less developed countries: diversification performance by continent, 1962-2010  
  
Values of IMF  export diversification index: 
 Value, 1962 Value, 2010 Change 1962-
2010(%) 
Africa: Overall diversification score, 1962-
2010(%):  
 
weighted average 
 
unweighted average 
 
 
Individual countries: 
Nigeria 
D.R.Congo 
South Africa 
Mauritius 
 
 
 
5.01 
 
4.93 
 
 
 
3.73 
4.13 
2.74 
6.09 
 
 
 
 
 
5.25 
 
4.78 
 
 
 
5.78 
5.77 
2.23 
2.99 
 
 
 
+4.6 
 
-3.1 
 
 
 
+54.9 
+39.7 
-18.7 
-49.0 
Asia: Overall diversification score, 1962-2010 
(%): 
 
weighted average 
unweighted average 
Individual countries: 
China 
India 
South Korea 
Bangladesh 
 
 
 
 
3.09 
3.80 
 
2.14 
3.08 
3.13 
5.11 
 
 
 
 
2.30 
2.77 
 
1.96 
1.92 
2.37 
4.81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-25.6 
-26.9 
 
-8.5 
-37.7 
-24.3 
-5.9 
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Latin America: Overall diversification score, 
1962-2010(%): 
weighted average 
unweighted average 
Individual countries: 
Brazil 
Bolivia 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
 
 
4.09 
4.34 
 
4.11 
5.08 
3.02 
5.02 
 
 
2.84 
3.14 
 
2.45 
3.61 
2.44 
3.67 
 
 
 
 
-30.6 
-27.7 
 
-40.4 
-29.0 
-19.3 
-26.9 
 
 
All LDCs: Overall diversification score, 1962-
2010 (%): 
weighted average 
unweighted average 
 
 
 
3.72 
4.35 
 
 
2.99 
3.56 
 
 
 
 
-19.7 
-18.2 
Source:  calculated from IMF(2014c). Note that lower levels of the export diversification index reflect 
higher levels of diversification. 
 
  This is the more worrying because their trade policies have, on most criteria, greatly 
improved over recent years.  The main suggestion towards export diversification made by 
international financial agencies over the last three decades, namely liberalisation of trade 
protection and a move to more competitive exchange rates ŝŶƚŚĞƐƉŝƌŝƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ
ŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ?, has been substantially implemented, especially in the poorest countries of 
Africa, and yet appears to have borne little fruit.  This opens up the question: if Washington 
Consensus policies will not work, what will? - which then leads to a further question: under 
what circumstances will alternative, presumably more interventionist, policies be politically 
feasible? This paper is focussed around these two questions. 
     Ten yeaƌƐĂŐŽ ?ZŽĚƌŝŬ ?ƐĨĂŵŽƵƐƉĂƉĞƌ ‘'ŽŽĚďǇĞtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽŶƐĞŶƵƐ ?,ĞůůŽ
tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶ ? ? ?ZŽĚƌŝŬ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƐƉĂǁŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐŚĂǀĞŶŽƚƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĚƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂŶĂŐƌĞĞĚ
definition either of what trade openness was or what policy instruments were required to 
achieve it. Notably, it argued that complementary reforms in institutions (notably legal 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?ůĂďŽƵƌŵĂƌŬĞƚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?ŽĨƚĞŶĂĞƵƉŚĞŵŝƐŵĨŽƌĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ
social safety nets)4 were needed, over and above policies of  trade liberalisation, in order to 
provide the competitive cutting edge required to make openness work, in the sense of both 
competitiveness and political sustainability. However, Rodrik also emphasised, echoing the 
tŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚŽŶLearning from a Decade of Reform, that the experience of 
                                                          
4 These are four of the ten institutional reforms highlighted by Rodrik as needing to be added to the original 
Washington Consensus; oƚŚĞƌƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ‘tdKĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚƉŽǀĞƌƚǇƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌĞŵƵĐŚǀĂŐƵĞƌ
than this. 
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liberalisation demonstrated the need for country-specific approaches rather than the 
ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƉĂĐŬĂŐĞ ?ŽƌǁŚĂƚZŽĚƌŝŬĐĂůůƐĂ ‘ůĂƵŶĚƌǇůŝƐƚ ?, of institutional 
ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ? ‘tŚĂƚǁŽƌŬƐ ?, on this view, was likely to vary both over time and between 
countries5. However, even accepting the validity of all of this, the fact remains that progress 
with diversification into export-based manufacturing across the whole of Africa over the last 
thirty years has been, with the important exceptions mentioned above, close to zero. In 
particular this has been the case in the two countries  W Ghana and Botswana  W whose 
success in combining rapid growth with pro-poor, democratic institutional development has 
been most outstanding. 
    Since Rodrik wrote, the debate has moved forward in three ways. First, a range of 
writings on the developmental states of the   ‘ĂƐƚƐŝĂŶDŝƌĂĐůĞ ? ?ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
impressive exercises in diversification that has ever occurred, have reminded us that the 
policies employed by nearly all ƚŚĞ ‘ŵŝƌĂĐůĞ ? countries have gone a good way beyond 
ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶZŽĚƌŝŬ ?Ɛ ‘augmented tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ?, and  in particular 
involve, over and above the measures described there, an expanded role for the state and in 
particular capital controls and protectionist measures.  However, such protection is typically 
time-bound,  temporary, and targeted on industries with demonstrable export potential.  
Second,  the Bank has moved beyond the Rodrik analysis in the sense of 
acknowledging that Ă ‘ŶĞǁƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ? ?ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶĞĚďǇ:ƵƐƚŝŶzŝĨƵ>ŝŶ ?ƚŚĞtŽƌůĚ
ĂŶŬ ?ƐĐŚŝĞĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚ ?ŚĂƐĞŵĞƌŐĞĚ ?ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĚĞĨŝŶŵŽƌĞƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇ how economic policy 
recommendations need to  adapt to the world of imperfect markets. >ŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ŶĞǁƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ? (2011) is presented as a modernised version of the structuralist economics of 
the 1950s constructed by writers such as Rosenstein-Rodan (1943),  Lewis(1954), and 
Hirschman(1958),  which argued that underdevelopment, and specifically the failure of 
many LDCs to diversify from the production of commodities to manufacture for export, 
could be ascribed to  failures in the markets for capital, labour and knowledge. Lin begins by 
suggesting that the difference between the new and the old structural economics is that the 
new economics lays less emphasis on state intervention: 
 
The new structural economics concludes that the role of the state in industrial 
diversification and upgrading should be limited to: 
 the provision of information about the new industries,  the coordination of related  
investments across different firms in the same industries, the 
compensation of information externalities for pioneer firms, and the nurturing of 
new industries through incubation and encouragement of foreign direct  investment 
(Lin 2011: 206).  
 
                                                          
5  ‘dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƵŶŝƋƵĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůƐĞƚŽĨƌƵůĞƐ ?tĞŶĞĞĚƚŽŐĞƚĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵĨŽƌŵƵůĂĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌĞůƵƐŝǀĞ
 “ďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ? ?tŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?
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In this spirit, and by contrast with the original structuralists and the developmental states 
literature, he rejects protection, even in the form of export subsidy, as a development 
strategy (Lin 2011: 198, 206). However, on the next page he significantly adds: 
 
 Physical infrastructure in general is a binding constraint for growth in less developed  
 countries and governments need to play a critical role in providing essential 
 infrastructure to facilitate economic development (Lin 2011: 207)4. 
 
This brings us close to the argument of the recent WIDER study (Newman et al  
(2016)) ŽĨ ‘ǁŚǇƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƐŽůŝƚƚůĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŝŶĨƌŝĐĂ ? ?dŚŝƐ ?ůŝŬĞ>ŝŶ, praises policies for the 
ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?ĂƐ ‘ŽŶĞǁĂǇŽĨŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐŚŝŐŚĞƌĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇĨŝƌŵƐŝŶƚŽĂůŽǁĞƌ
ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?EĞǁŵĂŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?>ŝŬĞƚŚĞ>ŝŶĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ŝƚĚƌĂǁƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽ
the importance of infrastructure, especially electric power and transport, in determining 
competitiveness5.  In more detail than the Lin article, it also draws attention to the role of 
the skills gap and especially managerial education in determining that competitiveness. 
Several general reviews of export diversification, such as Bartz(2010)  Huria and 
Brenton(2015), and Elhiraika and Mbate(2014), following a mainly econometric 
methodology, have arrived at the same conclusions as Lin and the UNU-WIDER authors, 
namely that the things which make export diversification possible are high levels of 
infrastructure, human capital and institutional capacity. 
  
At this point, however, we need to switch our attention to the question of what 
makes export-based industrialisation politically feasible.  For various reasons LDC 
governments have shown indifference or even hostility to policies which will promote 
competitiveness and diversification, in particular where the state is weak and, as a 
consequence, vulnerable to pressures from rent-seeking special interest groups  - often 
trading companies and multinational corporations with an interest in cheap imports and 
consequently in frustrating competitive exchange-rate policies. And since the state is 
weaker in Africa than elsewhere, that is a good reason for expecting the politics of 
diversification to be more difficult in Africa, and for using the manner in which rents are 
allocated as  a lens through which to try and understand it. 
dŚŝƐŚĂƐǇŝĞůĚĞĚƐŽŵĞĨĂƐĐŝŶĂƚŝŶŐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ?ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĚ<ĂŶŐ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽŶ
Crony Capitalism, which makes a comparison between two Far Eastern countries both 
characterised by high levels of corruption and pressure from special interest groups, but 
very divergent outcomes: the Philippines, where the rent-seekers as a group have had the 
upper hand and competitiveness has suffered, and South Korea, where the state has been 
able to play off different groups of rent-seekers against one another, so as to produce what 
                                                          
4 Lin illustrates this with the statistic that freight and insurance costs in Africa are 200% of the global average 
(Lin 2011: 208) 
5  /ŶƚŚĞǀŝĞǁŽĨEĞǁŵĂŶĞƚĂů ? ‘ƌĞůŝĂďůĞĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐĂůƉŽǁĞƌŵĂǇďĞĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚƐŝŶŐůĞŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ
ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ? ?/ƚŝƐƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŽƌĞcall the role played by electrical shortages in aggravating the current economic 
crises of both Ghana and Zambia ( Mosley 2017: chapters 3 and 4 ). 
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<ĂŶŐĐĂůůƐĂ ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚďŽƚŚƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞůŝƚĞƐƐĞƚƚůĞĨŽƌĂ
compromise allocation of rents rather than each group trying to checkmate the other. Thus 
high levels of corruption  W  which the donors are still furiously trying to stamp out as part of 
ƚŚĞ ‘ĂƵŐŵĞŶƚĞĚtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ? ?ĂƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂďŽǀĞ- , may be perfectly consistent, 
as in South Korea, with high levels of diversification and pro-competitiveness policies. In 
short, we need better indicators of governance than simply the level of corruption. The 
recent book by Whitfield et al (2016) explores these issues in detail in relation to Africa; they 
find (2016, Chapters 3 and 4) that the less the power of excluded factions , the more 
cohesive is the ruling elite and the stronger the technical capacity of the exporting business 
group, the greater is ƚŚĞůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚŽĨĂ ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ?ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ?ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨ
corruption, and being able to carry diversification initiatives through.  
 
 We thus have one classical story (inadequate liberalisation) and four new stories 
 ?ZŽĚƌŝŬ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂƐĂĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƚŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽŶ
ƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨŚĞƚĞƌŽĚŽǆŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐŝŶƉƵƚƐƵďƐŝĚǇ ?>ŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞ
importance of (lack of) human capital and infrastructure as barriers to diversification; and 
new political economy approaches) which may help us to understand the barriers to export 
diversification in Africa. In what follows, we embed these stories into an estimating model 
(section 2);  this is then tested by means of a qual-quant methodology through two different 
routes. Route one (Section 3) uses both a single-equation approach and an instrumental-
variables, panel-data regression model, using World Bank Global Development Indicators 
data from 1980 to 2010; and route two (section 4) uses a case-study approach, focussing on 
Mauritius -  the one low-income African country which, so far, has progressed to become an 
exporter of manufactures, and also a country on which Chris Milner, appropriately for this 
symposium, possesses experience and expertise far exceeding mine.  Section 5 presents the 
policy ideas and conclusions which emerge from our discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The model to be estimated 
 
                 Compressing the ideas so far presented into a single narrative, we reach the 
picture presented by Figure 1, which is an export-possibility frontier whose axes represent 
exports of manufactures (Xm) and exports of primary commodities (Xpc). The characteristic 
African country is trapped low down the frontier, at a point such as A on Figure 1, with a low 
proportion of manufactured exports in total exports and, because of this,  is vulnerable to 
fluctuations in primary commodity prices ( as emphasised by Greenaway and Milner (1991)) 
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and continuinŐĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚƌĂĚĞ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ? ?ŽĨ
course, attempted to extract Africa from this bind through liberalisation of tariff protection 
and, especially, the real exchange rate; but, as discussed above, the liberalisations of the 
1980s were very partially implemented (because they threatened the access of powerful 
rent-seekers to cheap food and cheap inputs) and also because, to the extent they were 
implemented, they favoured exporters of primary products, such as Ghanaian cocoa, at 
least as much as exporters of manufactures, such as Ghanaian textiles, and sometimes 
more. In order to achieve diversification, therefore (i.e. a north-westward movement on 
Figure 1), stimulative real-exchange policies need to be complemented by: 
(i) input subsidies targeted on manufacturing activities with export potential  W 
ideally, as in the Far East, temporary and performance-based, so as to give the 
maximum possible incentive to competitiveness; and also 
(ii) ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ‘ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŽĨƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ counterbalance the pressure of powerful 
rent-ƐĞĞŬĞƌƐŝŶĞǀĞƌǇ>ĨŽƌƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ƵƌďĂŶďŝĂƐ ? ?>ŝƉƚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĂƚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?
i.e. cheap inputs and hence a high, uncompetitive exchange rate; and thus 
ĞŶĂďůĞĂ ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐturing exporters to 
emerge, as for example in South Korea, Indonesia and Mauritius (Mosley, 2017: 
Chapters 2 and 7). 
dŚĞƐĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?ŝĨŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ ?ŵĂŬĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĂƐŚŝĨƚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŝĐĞůŝŶĞ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĂƚŝŽŽĨ
incentives to manufacturing exporters to incentiveƐƚŽƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐ ?ĨƌŽŵyzƚŽy ?z ? ?ŝŶ
other words a movement from point A to point B on the transformation curve of Figure 1. 
dŚŝƐƚĂŬĞƐƵƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞǁĂǇƚŚĞƌĞ PďƵƚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ>ŝŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶĞǁ
structural economics come into play. These arguments emphasise that in a world of poor 
infrastructure and imperfect and sometimes non-existent markets for labour and for both 
financial and human capital (as especially in Africa) the development of all high-tech 
activities, and notably manufacturing, is constrained. If these arguments are accepted, 
investment in infrastructure and human capital have the ability to push outward the 
transformation curve for high-tech in relation to low-tech activities (an upward movement 
 ?Žƌ ‘ƵŶĨůĂƚƚĞŶŝŶŐ ? ?ŽĨthe left-hand part of  Figure 1), which leads to a further diversification 
of the export base, illustrated by the movement from B to C on Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. A model of diversification 
 
 
Exports of manufactures(Xm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                            Diversification (Xm/Xpc) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   Exports of 
                                                                                                   primary comm.(xpc)                              
 
 
 
dŚƵƐŽƵƌ ‘ĐŽƌĞŵŽĚĞů ?ŽĨĚŝǀĞƌƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞƌĞƉƌĞƐ ŶƚĞĚĂƐ P 
 
Export diversification = f (RER*subs, TGE, (Inf+HC/TGE), AR)                            (1)                                                  
 
where: 
 
ED = export diversification 
 
RER= real exchange rate 
A 
B 
C 
X 
y ? 
z ? 
Y 
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TGE = total government expenditure 
 
subs = level of targeted input subsidies  
 
Inf = infrastructural investment 
 
HC= human capital investment (health and education) 
 
ZA? ‘ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŽĨƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ?, or counterpoise to rent-seekers 
 
This core model is portrayed diagrammatically in Figure 2a. 
 
 
&ŝŐƵƌĞ ?Ă ?ĂƵƐĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐŝŶƚŚĞ ?ĐŽƌĞŵŽĚĞů ? 
 
Core model: 
 
 
 
Tar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          We estimate the core model (1) in two forms: firstly as a single equation by 
ordinary least squares and secondly embedded in a larger model which instruments for 
those right-hand side variables which are endogenous  W in particular public expenditure 
Real exchange rate 
(RER) 
Political influences on 
real exchange rate 
(notably state-business 
relations) 
Level and composition of  public 
expenditure (in particular, share 
of  infrastructure and human 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ? ? ‘ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŽĨƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ? 
Diversification index 
Targeted subsidies to 
manufacturing exports 
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which helps to cause, but is also caused by, diversification and growth. This larger model, 
which is estimated by instrumental variables (3SLS) contains four other relationships: 
First,Public expenditure is determined by the ability of states to raise revenue, and 
hence by tax effort (the tax/GDP ratio); 
TGE = f (tax/GDP)                                                                                                               (2) 
where TGE is total government expenditure. 
Second, the tax ratio is determined by income level (reflecting the observation of 
Moore (1999) that low-income countries, tending to have weaker states, therefore have 
greater difficulty in raising revenue, and by democratic accountability, reflecting our own 
finding (Lenton, Masiye and Mosley, 2017) that people are more willing to pay tax if they do 
ƐŽŝŶĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞĨŽƌƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨĂ ‘ĨŝƐĐĂůĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ
materialise under democratic governance; the ratio of aid flows to GNP is included as a 
control variable: 
Tax/GDP = f (demacc, GNP/cap, aid/GNP)                                                                                      (3) 
 where GNP/cap is per capita GNP and aid/GNP is the ratio of aid flows to GNP. 
  Third, the ƌĂƚĞŽĨ'WŐƌŽǁƚŚ ?'EW' ?ŝƐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚďǇĂ ‘ŶĞǁŐƌŽǁƚŚƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĞƋƵĂƚŝŽŶ
which fairly standardly contains terms for capital investment (physical and human) and 
initial income, but also for diversification and aid flows: 
GNPG = f (I, HC,  ED, GDPC1988,aid/GNP)                                                                                         (4) 
              where I is physical capital investment and GDPC1988 is initial income (GDP per capita 
in 1988). 
Diversification, as in the core model, is endogenous to the real exchange rate, the value of 
targeted subsidies, the composition of public expenditure (in particular the share of human 
capital in total government spending ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨ ‘ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŽĨƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
we estimate by means of the Polity index of governance: 
ED       =     f  (RER*subs, HC/TGE, aid/GNP, Polity)                                                                        (5) 
        Finally and again fairly standardly we use population and initial income as instruments 
for aid: 
Aid/GNP = f (population, GDPC1988)                                                                                                (6) 
The system consisting of relationships (2) through (6), embodying our diversification story as 
its core, is portrayed in Figure 2b. 
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Figure 2b. Causal relationships in the  ?ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚŵŽĚĞů ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real exchange rate 
(RER) 
Political influences on 
real exchange rate 
(notably state-business 
relations) 
Level and composition of  
public expenditure (in 
particular, share of  
infrastructure and human 
capital) 
Diversification index 
Targeted subsidies to 
manufacturing exports 
Tax/GDP ratio 
Democratisation, 
controls 
Physical 
investment 
Overseas aid 
(AID/GNP) 
Controls 
(population and 
initial GNP) 
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3. Quantitative results 
                  In Table 2, we estimate the simple model of figure 2a by ordinary least squares in 
the first column, and the extended model of figure 2b by instrumental-variables methods in 
the last five columns, against data over a thirty-year span, from the early 1980s to the early 
2010s,  for all developing countries for which data are available. The findings of the table 
ĐŽƵůĚďĞƐƵŵŵĞĚƵƉŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐ ‘ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŶŽƚĞŶŽƵŐŚ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝĐŵŽĚĞůŽĨ&ŝŐƵƌĞ
2a,  using ordinary least-squares estimation, the impact of the real exchange rate on the IMF 
diversification index, controlling for the growth of GDP and the ratio of total expenditure to 
GDP, is statistically insignificant (column 1). However, within this same model the real 
exchange rate becomes a significant influence on diversification  if the real exchange rate is 
interacted with the ratio of input subsidies to GDP, mentioned above as a key element in 
heterodox explanations of diversification, and this significant association continues to be the 
case, as shown in columns 2 to 6 of the table, if the estimating model is embedded within 
the simultaneous-equations framework of Figure 2b, which treats public expenditure as 
endogenous. There are no obvious problems of overidentification within this simultaneous-
equations framework, as indicated by the values of the Sargan-Hansen test statistics 
reported in the bottom row of the table. It appears on ƚŚŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚ>ŝŶ ?s story to the 
effect ƚŚĂƚ ‘market imperfections ĂƌĞĐƌƵĐŝĂů ? needs to be supplemented:  specifically, what 
needs to be added, on this evidence, is that protectionism, in the form of input subsidies, is 
needed to overcome those market imperfections, and that infrastructure on its own will not 
deliver diversification.  
 
 
 
 
 
GDP per capita 
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Table 2. Drivers of diversification: regression analysis 
 
                    Dependent  
                    variable 
 
 
(1)Diversification index (2)Tax/ 
GDP ratio 
(3)Public 
expendit
ure/GDP 
ratio 
(4)GDP 
growth 
(5)Diversifi
cation 
index (note 
2) 
(6)Aid as 
% GNP 
Model Core model (from Figure 
2a) 
Extended model (from Figure 2b) 
Estimation method OLS 3SLS 
Regression  
coefficients 
on independent 
variables: 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
3.55***                3.37*** 
(11.84)                (20.79) 
 
 
 
 
 
10.29*** 
(8.16) 
 
 
 
 
 
6.10*** 
(3.61) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.78 
0.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.98 
19.28 
 
 
 
 
 
12.41 
13.62 
GDP growth -0.045**              -0.022** 
(2.13)                   (2.37) 
     
Democratic 
accountability 
(Polity IV index) 
 0.66* 
(1.71) 
    
 ‘dĂǆĞĨĨŽƌƚ ‘ 
(tax-to-GDP ratio) 
  1.14*** 
(9.00) 
   
Total investment/GDP 
ratio 
   0.54*** 
(3.32) 
  
Total government 
expenditure/GNP ratio 
0.049***            0.018*** 
(4.16)                  (2.63) 
  
 
-0.44*** 
(4.36) 
  
 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
(1990=100) (note 3) 
 
                         -0.00004 
                           (1.48) 
   
-0.0005*** 
(2.81) 
  
 ‘/ŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐƚŽ
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?
(input subsidies/GDP x 
real effective 
exchange rate) 
-0.00008*** 
(3.18) 
   -0.00004* 
(1.78) 
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Human capital/total 
public expenditure 
ratio 
-0.013*** 
(5.37) 
   -0.1007 
(0.14) 
 
Diversification index    
 
1.13 
(1.49) 
  
Aid/GNP ratio    0.69** 
(2.22) 
  
Polity index of 
governance quality 
                           -0.051*** 
                            (6.61) 
     
Population      -0.008*** 
(5.35) 
Current GNP per 
capita 
  -0.001 
4.69 
   
GNP per capita in 1988    -0.0001 
0.12 
 -0.005 
5.38 
 ‘ƌ2 ? 0.22                 0.11 0.02 0.39 0.83 0.06 0..34 
Number of 
observations 
153                  515 146 146 146 146 146 
P 0.0000            0.0224 0.2181 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
Sargan-Hansen 
overidentification 
statistic (p-value) 
NA                    NA 0.0433 0.8711 0.7619 0.6032 0.1955 
  
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM.. 
Sample: All LDCs for which the required data are available. 
Estimation method:  OLS (column 1) and 3SLS(other columns). 
 
Notes:  (1) Figures in brackets ďĞŶĞĂƚŚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐĂƌĞ^ƚƵĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛƚ-statistics; ***/**/* denote 
significance of a coefficient at the 1%/5%/10% ratio.   
(2) The diversification index is that prepared by the IMF (see IMF 2014b ), which falls from 
10 to zero as the measured export diversification rate rises.  
(3) The real effective exchange rate (REER) is defined in terms of value of the domestic monetary unit 
per unit of other currencies: thus an increase in the REER connotes a fall in its value relative to the 
dollar and other currencies, and hence an increase in competitiveness. 
 
                   It is desirable to confirm that these results are robust with respect to variations in 
specification,  and in particular that the ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨŽƵƌ ‘incentives to 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞĐŽŶŶŽƚĞƐŐĞŶƵŝŶĞĐĂƵƐĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚŶŽƚĂĐŚĂŶĐĞĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŽƚŚŝƐ
end, we lag the incentives to competitiveness (real exchange rate x share of input subsidies 
in GNP) variable on the diversification index, and introduce into the explanatory story a new 
right-hand side variable, the Polity index of governance quality. Also, it is important to see 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ?ĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚďǇĚƌŝĂŶtŽŽĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ŽƵƌƐƚŽƌǇƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝŶƉƵƚ
subsidies ĂƌĞĐƌƵĐŝĂů ?ŚŽůĚƐƵƉŝŶƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŬĞǇĚƌŝǀĞƌƐŽĨĚŝǀĞƌƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
namely human capital and governance quality. 
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Table 3. Drivers of diversification: robustness tests 
 
                    Dependent  
                    variable 
 
 
(1)Diversification index (2)Tax/ 
GDP 
ratio 
(3)Public 
expenditure
/GDP ratio 
(4)GDP 
growth 
(5)Diversifica
tion 
index(note 
2) 
(6)Aid as 
% GNP 
Model Core model (from Figure 2a) Extended model (from Figure 2b) 
Estimation method OLS 3SLS 
Regression  
coefficients 
on independent 
variables: 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
3.18*** 
(15.85) 
 
 
 
 
 
3.51*** 
(11.67) 
 
 
 
 
 
6.42*** 
(3.09) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.59*** 
(4.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17.1* 
(1.58) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.02*** 
(18.27) 
 
 
 
 
 
27.96*** 
(6.30) 
 
GDP growth -0.04*** 
(2.69) 
-0.045*** 
(2.08) 
     
Democratic 
accountability 
(Polity IV index) 
  1.88*** 
(2.97) 
    
 ‘dĂǆĞĨĨŽƌƚ ‘ 
(tax-to-GDP ratio) 
   0.74*** 
(2.82) 
   
Total investment/GDP 
ratio 
    0.25* 
(1.66) 
  
Total government 
expenditure/GNP ratio 
0.029*** 
(3.59) 
0.044*** 
(3.65) 
  
 
   
World Bank openness 
index 
    -0.028** 
(2.12) 
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 ‘/ŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐƚŽ
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?
(input subsidies/GDP x 
real effective 
exchange rate), 
lagged one period 
 
-0.00004* 
(1.76) 
-0.00007*** 
(2.82) 
   -0.0001*** 
(4.97) 
 
Human capital/total 
public expenditure 
ratio 
 -0.122*** 
(4.69) 
   -0.16*** 
(4.01) 
 
Diversification index 
(lagged one period) 
 -0.0005** 
(2.04) 
  
 
1.53 
(0.94) 
  
Aid/GNP ratio     0.25** 
(2.35) 
  
Polity index of 
governance quality 
 -0.022* 
(1.52) 
     
Population       -0.085*** 
(6.14) 
Current GNP per 
capita 
  -0.0007 
(0.36) 
-0.007** 
(1.96) 
   
GNP per capita in 1988     -0.016* 
(1.75) 
 -0.029*** 
(2.93) 
 ‘ƌ2 ?  0.20 0.21 0.21 0.32 0.36 0.44 
Number of 
observations 
 153 53 53 53 53 53 
P  0.0000 0.0047 0.009 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
Sources and sample: as for Table 2. 
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As shown in Table 3, the explanatory power of the estimating equations, both in single-
equation and simultaneous-equation formulations, is substantially unaffected by these 
changes in specification, although the crucial response-coefficient of  incentives to 
competitiveness on diversification is now significant only at the 5%, and not the 1%, level. 
Importantly, lagged input subsidies continue , across the sample as a whole,  to be an 
influence on diversification (within the OLS estimations) even in the absence of the 
governance, human capital and GDP per capita measures, even though now at a lower level 
of significance6. 
 
 
4. Focus on Africa: case-study analysis 
                   In order to focus more sharply on the key problem, which is the failure of Africa 
to diversify its exports, we now concentrate the analysis on that part of the sample, and in 
particular on variations in policy across the African continent. The relationships explored in 
Tables 2 and 3 above have given us an indication as to what policy pathways may need to be 
followed in order to improve on that performance; however, they do not give us any clue 
about the politics which has enabled those pathways to be followed. Specifically, Tables 2 
and 3 showed that a major barrier to diversification in Africa has been an overvalued 
exchange rate, aggravated by market imperfection which governments have not been 
proactive in offsetting. This typically arises from the politically powerful (namely 
multinational companies and their clients in government) pressing for and achieving policies 
ǁŚŝĐŚĐŚĞĂƉĞŶŝŶƉƵƚƐŽŶĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?ŽĨƚĞŶŬŶŽǁŶĂƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ƵƌďĂŶďŝĂƐ ? (Lipton 
1977, Bates 1981), in which overvalued exchange rates are an important element, but are  
compounded by subsidies being put on commodities such as food and fuels (especially 
petroleum) rather than on exportable manufactures. However, we have not yet explored 
the process by which these policy biases, in a small number of countries, have been 
overthrown. We now investigate this issue. 
 Let us begin from a scatterplot (Figure 3) relating two of the fundamental variables in 
the story - export diversification and the rate of real exchange rate devaluation since the 
1980s. The correlation between the two variables is significant, but there are a number of 
outliers, both positive and negative:  on the one hand countries such as Mozambique and 
Ghana ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚŝŵƵůƵƐ ?ŽĨƌĞĂůĚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐŶŽƚƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ŽĨ
diversification, and on the other hand countries such as Mauritius where the level of 
diversification, as shown in the diagram, exceeds what would have been expected from the 
                                                          
6 dŚĞƋƵĂůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞƐĂŵƉůĞĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ?ŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ?ƐĚƌŝĂŶtŽŽĚƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽƵƚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐe, 
merely to show that input subsidies are a significant influence on diversification across the set of developing 
countries as a whole is not to be able to show that the application of input subsidies would achieve 
diversification in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (or any other country with impossible governance 
problems). 
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movement in its exchange rate. Study of both kinds of outliers can help us understand the 
processes, political and otherwise, which favour diversification.
20 
 
Figure 3 Scatter of export diversification in relation to real exchange rate, African countries, 2008-10 compared with 1980-82 
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In what follows we shall focus on the only country in Africa to have been successful at 
export-based industrialisation, namely Mauritius, which has gone over the last forty years 
from almost exclusive  dependence on sugar exports to being a large-scale exporter of 
textiles, semiconductors and other IT components, and services, notably tourism 
(Subramaniam, 2009).   DĂƵƌŝƚŝƵƐ ?ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚ is the more extraordinary because, in the 
1960s,  it was politically insecure under the threat of social conflict provoked by severe 
social inequalities caused by the dominance of the sugar estates in Mauritian economy and 
society ( Meade, 1961, 1967) 
 
 
 What delivered this extraordinary performance? In Table 4, we make a comparison 
between Mauritius and two other African countries, Ghana and Zambia, whose 
diversification performance was weak even though their liberalisation policies  were only 
slightly less competitive than in Mauritius (indeed the rate of exchange-rate devaluation, 
considered on its own, was more dramatic in Ghana than in Mauritius, as shown in Figure 3). 
Therefore, as argued in the previous section, exchange-rate policy on its own does not give 
a complete explanation of diversification. So what made the difference?  Not, in this case, 
infrastructure and education, often cited (e.g.  EĞǁŵĂŶĞƚĂů ? ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨŽƌhEh-
WIDER) as a key determinant of the success of diversification: the level of these variables, as 
the table shows, is certainly higher in Mauritius than in Ghana and Zambia, but their rates of 
change (columns 5 and 6 of Table 4) are actually higher in the comparator (non-diversifying) 
countries. Rather, we believe, the answer is to be found in fiscal policies, but highly 
heterodox fiscal policies, which gave temporary shelter to non-traditional activities with 
export potential. First, as we can see from column 2 of the table, Mauritius had higher 
average rates of protection in 1990 than Ghana and Zambia but a lower rate in 2010, 
suggesting that in that country protection, during the years of structural adjustment, was 
focussed on specific strategic industries with export potential rather than succumbing to the 
pressures of  importers and of urban bias; after 2000, once exporters had thereby gained a 
comparative advantage, protection was liberalised. Secondly, subsidies in Mauritius were 
applied in a quite different way, being often applied to potential exportables, whereas in 
Ghana and especially in Zambia (column 3 of the table) they were mainly used to reduce the 
cost of imports. These differences in subsidy policy derive from differences in the power-
structures of the two country groups, with exporters being much better represented in the 
governing coalition of  Mauritius than of Ghana. To understand the origins of these differing 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?ǁĞŶŽǁŶĞĞĚƚŽĚĞůǀĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ
examine the predicament which they faced in the 1960s. 
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Table 4. Possible drivers of successful diversification in Africa 
 
 (1)Export 
diversification 
rate(2010 as 
% of 1982) 
Possible drivers of export diversification: 
Policies: Resources: Governance and power-relationships: 
(2)Nominal 
protection 
rate 
1990(2010) 
(3)Subsidy 
regime 
(4) Real 
exchange rate, 
2014 or 
nearest 
year(1990=100) 
(5) Infrastructure 
provision (electric 
power 
consumption per 
capita, kilowatt-
hours 1990(2010) 
(6) Human 
capital 
provision 
(growth of 
secondary-
school 
enrolment 
rate,%)  
1990(2010) 
(7)Political 
structure 
(8) State-business 
relations(Kang-Ayo 
classification) 
 Successful diversifiers: 
Mauritius 69.9 26.5 (1.1) Subsidy (duty 
exemption) on 
manufacturing 
within export 
processing zones 
(financed by tax 
on sugar exports) 
124 Na 118 Multi-party 
democracy 
since 1968 
Strategic alliance 
between (mostly Franco-
Mauritian) sugar planters 
and (mostly Indian) skilled 
workers 
                                     Unsuccessful diversifiers: 
Ghana 87.1 22.0 (8.6) Consumer 
subsidies on food 
and petrol; input 
subsidies only on 
cocoa 
186 301(298) 153 Democratic 
since 1992 
Since early 1990s: 
strategic alliance between 
state and cocoa sector 
Zambia 81.7 8.0(3.8) Consumer 
subsidies on food 
and petrol; input 
subsidies on 
fertilizers 
79 503(623) 120 Dominant 
party to 
2006, then  
multiparty
democratic  
Mainly rentier-dominated 
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Average, less 
successful 
diversifiers: 
84.4 15.0(6.2)  132 402(460) 30(42)   
Sources and notes: Col. 1 ʹ Calculated from IMF(2014b). Note that diversification is measured on the IMF scale, in which higher numbers denote lower 
levels of diversification: thus in this column, the lower the number, the more diversification has occurred since 1982. 
                 Col. 2 -  from World Bank, World Development Indicators. Note that there is a wide discrepancy between the measures of nominal protection 
recorded here and effective protection rates: for example, the effective protection rate for Mauritius in 1990 was 129%, whilst the rate of nominal 
protection was 26% (Gulhati and Nallari 1990: 27 ). 
   Col. 3 -  from Mosley(2017) Chapters 2-5 and 7 . 
                Col. 4 ʹ from Mosley(2017), Table 2.1. The real exchange rate (RER) is defined as the number of units of domestic currency that can be exchanged 
for a US dollar, corrected for differences in inflation between the two countries: therefore, values in excess of 100 indicate a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate over the period indicated. 
               Cols. 5  and 6 ʹ from World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
               Cols. 7 and 8  W from Mosley(2017) Chapter 2  (especially Figure 2.3) , with interpolations for Mauritius from ibid., Chapter 7.               
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 Mauritius, in the mid 1960s, was represented by the Nobel Prizewinner James 
Meade (1961, 1967), following on his visits to the island, as ground between the upper 
millstone of dependence on the monocropping of sugar7 and the nether millstone of rising 
inequality (between the white, Franco-Mauritian, urban elite and the low-income, mostly 
Indian, workers who cut the sugarcane), rising unemployment8 and consequent social 
protest, aggravated by a high rate of population growth.  
 ,ŽǁƚŽŐĞƚŽƵƚŽĨƚŚŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚDĞĂĚĞƐƚǇůĞĚĂƐĂ ‘DĂůƚŚƵƐŝĂŶƚƌĂƉ ? ?ƐĂ
small country with a population of well under a million, Mauritius was trapped in a small-
market, high-cost trap, compelled therefore to expand exports rapidly, or make things at 
home in face of foreign competition, or die. In fact, as Meade showed, there were just five 
options, which we present as bullet-points: 
x  ‘ŝƚŚĞƌĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐǁĂŐĞ-rates must be kept low, 
x or domestic labour productivity must be raised, 
x or imports must be restricted by tariffs and import licensing, 
x or exports must be subsidized, 
x ŽƌƚŚĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞDĂƵƌŝƚŝĂŶƌƵƉĞĞŵƵƐƚďĞĚĞƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞĚ ? 
                                                 (Meade 1967:256) 
      It is clear from the context that Meade did not expect any of these 
recommendations to be implemented9; in fact all five of them were, during the decade of 
the 1970s, and subsequent economic and political developments have not disturbed the 
developmental momentum that was thereby created. We will first document each of the 
ĨŝǀĞƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶĂƐůŝŐŚƚůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŽƌĚĞƌĨƌŽŵDĞĂĚĞ ?ƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ
the politics which enabled them to be brought into being. 
  ‘ŽŵĞƐƚŝĐůĂďŽƵƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŵƵƐƚďĞƌĂŝƐĞĚ ?: this was achieved by creating export 
processing zones (EPZs), financed in large part by taxes on sugar exports10 but also through 
rents from the EU-ACP  Protocol11, in which first a thriving textile industry and then an 
electronic components industry were created; from the 1980s onward, these were followed 
                                                          
7  ? ?A?ŽĨDĂƵƌŝƚŝƵƐ ?ĞǆƉŽƌƚƐĐĂŵĞĨƌŽŵƐƵŐĂƌŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐĂŚŝŐŚĞƌƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨĞǆƉŽƌƚƐĚĞƌŝǀĞĚ
from one  product than in any other country in the world (Meade 1967: 242) 
8 In 1967 unemployment in Mauritius was 37,000 out of a labour force of about half a million  W i.e. about 8%, 
or four times the average level prevailing in European countries at the time.  
9 ƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵŚŝƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚDĂƵƌŝƚŝƵƐďĞŝŶŐ ‘ĂĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇŝŶDĂůƚŚƵƐŝĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ? ?DĞĂĚĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚŝŶ
1961 that because of population pressures and inter-ĞƚŚŶŝĐƌŝǀĂůƌŝĞƐ ‘ƚŚĞŽƵƚůŽŽŬĨŽƌƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶ
DĂƵƌŝƚŝƵƐ ?ŝƐƉŽŽƌ ? ?DĞĂĚĞ ? ? ? ? ?ƋƵŽƚĞĚ in Subramaniam (2009:1) 
10 These export duties were at all times progressive so as to favour small sugar plantations at the expense of 
large ones  W for example between 1979-81 the rate of sugar export duty varied from zero for those producers 
exporting less than 20 tons to 23.6 per cent for those producers more than 3,000 tons. The sugar duty was 
constantly tinkered with, and a fuller account can be found in Gulhati and Nallari (1990: Table 2.2, page 22). 
Politically they thus fulfilled the same function as the IDH (Impuesto Directo en los Hidrocarburos) tax imposed 
on the Bolivian hydrocarbons industry in 2004 (Mosley 2017: chapter 5), which was also a progressive tax on a 
natural resource,  although in this case a non-renewable one. 
11 Under this agreement, the European Union paid a guaranteed price well above the export price for specific 
commodities, which in the case of Mauritian sugar in the 1980s was worth $200 million a year or about 4% of 
GDP to the national treasury. See Milner and Zgovu(2004) 
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by rapid expansion of tourism and financial services exports. Between them, these enabled 
Mauritius to develop its non-traditional (i.e. non-sugar) exports rapidly, from zero in 1970 to 
over 20% of total exports  ten years later to well over half at present. A key investor in the 
export processing zones was the small Chinese population of Mauritius which nonetheless 
 ‘ƉůĂǇĞĚĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌŽůĞŝŶĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚǁĂǀĞŽĨ ŽƌĞŝŐŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĨůŽǁƐĨƌŽŵ,ŽŶŐ<ŽŶŐ ?
Entrepreneurs from Hong Kong chose Mauritius as an investment location to circumvent the 
quotas on exports of textile and clothing from Hong Kong ?. (Subramaniam 2009:20) 
 
  ?dŚĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞDĂƵƌŝƚŝĂŶƌƵƉĞĞŵƵƐƚďĞĚĞƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞĚ ? ? from the 
start, Mauritius protected its competitiveness, after the manner of Far Eastern economies, 
by engineering a steady downward float of the real exchange rate. As shown by Figure 3, the 
rate of real depreciation of the Mauritian rupee (from 100 in 1970 to 155 in 2014)12 is by no 
means the most rapid in our sample, but what is notable is the steadiness of the signal sent 
by the exchange-ƌĂƚĞƚƌĞŶĚ PĂƐ^ƵďƌĂŵĂŶŝĂŵƉƵƚƐŝƚ ? ‘ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐĂďŽƵƚ
Mauritius is that it has managed to maintain a very competitive exchange rate for long 
ƉĞƌŝŽĚƐŽĨƚŝŵĞ ? ?^ƵďƌĂŵĂŶŝĂŵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƚĂůůƚŝŵĞƐ ŚĞůƉĞĚƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇƚŽ
diversify. 
 
 ?/ŵƉŽƌƚƐŵƵƐƚďĞƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚďǇƚĂƌŝĨĨƐĂŶĚŝŵƉŽƌƚůŝĐĞŶƐŝŶŐ ? and/or  ?ĞǆƉŽƌƚƐŵƵƐƚďĞ
ƐƵďƐŝĚŝƐĞĚ ?; in fact  Mauritius did both of these things, on a scale which puts into question 
^ĂĐŚƐĂŶĚtĂƌŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? P ?- ? ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĂƐ ‘ĂǀĞƌǇŽƉĞŶĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?
dĂƌŝĨĨƌĂƚĞƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ'ƵůŚĂƚŝĂŶĚEĂůůĂƌŝ ? ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽƌŝƐĞŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞ
1970s and early 1980s] except oŶĨŽŽĚŝƚĞŵƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇŝŵƉŽƌƚ
quotas, extended in 1981 from about 25% to 65% of total exports (Gulhati and Nallari 
1990:27), and the upshot was an effective protection rate far above the nominal protection 
rate, estimated by Gulhati and Nallari (ibid) at 89 per cent in 1980 for the manufacturing 
sector as a whole and by Greenaway and Milner(1989) at 128 per cent. Subsidies on exports 
of manufactures (by contrast with food subsidies, which had been in place for a long time) 
were instituted in the form of exemption from corporation tax and from import duties on 
raw materials under the Export Processing Zone Act of 198013: thus the structure of input 
subsidy in Mauritius was much more oriented towards the production of manufactures 
                                                          
12 Note that this index represents the number of Mauritian rupees that can be bought for a dollar, corrected 
for inflation: therefore an increase in this number represents a real devaluation. 
13 The main features are complete exemption from payment of import duty on capital goods; complete 
exemption from payment of import and excise duties on raw materials, components and semi-finished goods 
 ?ĞǆĐĞƉƚƐƉŝƌŝƚƐ ?ƚŽďĂĐĐŽ ?ĂŶĚƉĞƚƌŽůĞƵŵƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƚĂǆŚŽůŝĚĂǇĨŽƌƚĞŶƚŽƚǁĞŶƚǇǇĞĂƌƐ ?KƚŚĞƌ
features of the Act include loans at preferential rates for importing raw materials; electric power at subsidized 
rates; export finance at lower interest rates; loans up to 50 per cent of total building costs for a ten-year 
period;(and) priority in allocation of investment capital by Development ĂŶŬŽĨDĂƵƌŝƚŝƵƐ ? ?'ƵůŚĂƚŝĂŶĚEĂůůĂƌŝ
1990: 28). The last of these is particularly significant, as it goes beyond mere subsidy into administrative 
measures which push exporters to the front of the queue in the allocation of scarce inputs. As Subramaniam 
ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŚŝƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ&ĂƌĂƐƚĞƌŶǁĂǇŽĨĚŽŝŶŐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞĚŝƌŝŐŝƐƚĞ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŽĨ<ŽƌĞĂ ?dĂŝǁĂŶĂŶĚ:ĂƉĂŶƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĂƚŽĨ^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞĂŶĚ,ŽŶŐ<ŽŶŐ ? ?^ƵďƌĂŵĂŶŝĂŵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? 
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rather than in Ghana or Zambia, neither of which has become effectively involved in 
subsidising industry ?ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŶĂǀĞƌǇƐŵĂůůĂŶĚŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞǁĂǇŝŶ'ŚĂŶĂ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǆƉŽƌƚ
processing zones. In the course of the structural adjustment operations of the 1980s, in 
which the World Bank insisted on some liberalisation in return for financial support, the 
Mauritius government reduced and rationalised the rates of nominal protection against 
imports, but persuaded the Bank to allow it to keep nearly all the input subsidies in 
position14. These were crucial in enabling diversification in the export processing zones to 
take off. 
 
 ?ŽŵĞƐƚŝĐǁĂŐĞƌĂƚĞƐŵƵƐƚďĞŬĞƉƚůŽǁ ? ?this was done in a very partial but 
significant way, by exempting the Export Processing Zones from legislation which protected 
formal-sector employees against being made redundant, offered them the right to statutory 
overtime and protected them against being penalised for absenteeism. The upshot was that 
jobs in the EPZs were taken up mainly by non-unionised new entrants into the labour force, 
eighty per cent of them female, rather than by people with established jobs (Gulhati and 
Nallari 1990: 29) and that earnings in the EPZs were well below those earned in other parts 
of the economy15. However, alongside the competitive exchange rates and export subsidies 
mentioned earlier, these low wage rates were part of the process by which protectionism 
was prevented from imposing a competitive disadvantage on exporters16 and, indeed, 
enabled Mauritius to make rapid inroads into global textile, semiconductor and services 
markets. In addition, such was the rate of growth of overall earnings, and of the economy as 
a whole, that by contrast with many countries in Africa, (the Gini coefficient of) inequality 
across the island steadily declined, from 0.5 in 1962 to 0.34 in 2004 (Subramaniam 2009: 3). 
 
 From all of this it will be clear that Mauritius, especially in the 1970s and 80s, 
behaved as an idealised and all-too-rare-in-practice version of the Lewis (1954) model, in 
which thĞ ‘ƐƵƌƉůƵƐ ?ĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŐĂƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĞĂƌŶŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĂǁŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐĞǆƉŽƌƚ
sector and the subsistence wage is recycled, with active help from the fiscal system and 
overseas aid donors, into increasing and diversifying exports of manufactures. 
 
 The next question which we have to answer is: if this package of measures, in 
Mauritius, achieved happiness (in the shape of rapid growth, falling poverty, rapid 
diversification, and falling inequality) what made it politically feasible to implement? And, 
even more to the point, why did this package deliver happiness in Mauritius but fail to do so 
                                                          
14  See Subramaniam(2009:  14-15 ). ThankƐƚŽŚƌŝƐDŝůŶĞƌĨŽƌĚƌĂǁŝŶŐŵǇĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ůŽƉ-ƐŝĚĞĚ ?
character of liberalisation in Mauritius.       
15 Gulhati and Nallari (1990), figure 2.7, show average monthly earnings in the EPZ garment sector in the first 
half of the 1980s  as being around 600 (million rupees per month at constant 1970 prices), by contrast with 
government sector wages of just over 1,400 and an all-sector average of around 1,200. 
16 ZŽĚƌŝŬ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐDĂƵƌŝƚŝƵƐ ?ƚƌĂĚĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐŶŽƚŽƉĞŶďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌ ‘ŚĞƚĞƌŽĚŽǆ, with imports 
ďĞŝŶŐĐůŽƐĞĚĂŶĚĞǆƉŽƌƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŽƉĞŶ ? PƚŚŝƐŝƐƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨƐĞǀĞƌĂůĞĂƐƚƐŝĂŶ
developmental states, South Korea in particular (see Edwards (1998)) 
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in our other sample countries, even though the measures which they implemented  W in 
particular competitive exchange rates, input subsidy and tariff protection, were in many 
ways similar?   
 Part of the answer, we would argue, resides in the way democracy worked out in 
Mauritius by comparison with the other countries. At the time just after independence, 
ǁŚĞŶDĞĂĚĞǁƌŽƚĞŚŝƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůŐůŽŽŵǇƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞŝƐůĂŶĚ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉment prospects, its 
politics could be crudely characterised as a contest between two coalitions, one of them (led 
by the Parti Mauricien Social et Democrate, or PMSD) dominated by Franco-Mauritian, and 
the other (led by the Mauritius Labour Party, or MLP) by Indian, interest groups. The former 
held a preponderance of economic power through their ownership of the big sugar estates 
and the latter a preponderance of political power; indeed, it is not unreasonable to think of 
this contest as  a multi-ethnic variant of the nonzero-ƐƵŵŐĂŵĞ ?Žƌ ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ?
approach to inter-group competition, leading to the emergence of pro-competitiveness 
policies which hold rent-seekers in check, as per the approach of Kang(2002). Each group 
needed the other too much to fight over big issues such as the expropriation of the sugar 
estates. Power alternated between these groups during the crucial decade of the 1970s, and 
then in the 1980s passed to more radical groupings, initially (1982-83) led by the 
Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM) and then (1983-87) the Mouvement Socialiste 
Militant (MSM)17 into which many members of both the Franco-Mauritian and Indian 
communities migrated during the decade. Crucially, however, none of these realignments 
altered the consensus which formed in the 1970s around the idea of an inclusive, 
interventionist developmental state, committed to pro-exporter policies as a survival 
strategy. As Gulhati and Nallari explained nearly thirty years ago, this entailed many 
compromises, born of the idea that for all factions, the taking of extreme positions would 
entail risks (of expropriation, violent conflict, and consequent economic collapse)  which 
could not be afforded: 
Mauritius, therefore, was a deeply stratified society at independence. Franco-
Mauritians now had the economic power, but Hindus, who had come to the island as 
indentured labourers, now had political power. Such a schism could have produced a 
radical regime that might have tried to redress the exploitation suffered by Hindu 
labourers during the colonial period through confiscation of the assets of the 
affluent Franco-Mauritians. This did not happen. The commitment to parliamentary 
democracy pressured all parties to seek the middle ground. (Gulhati and Nallari 
1990:36; emphasis in original). 
In achieving this highly untypical political settlement, the role of Seewoosagur Ramgoolam,  
leader of the MLP coalition, prime minister from 1968 to 1982, and a Fabian socialist who 
nonetheless strongly supported private sector development on the grounds that in 
DĂƵƌŝƚŝƵƐ ‘ŝƚǁĂƐĚŽŝŶŐƐƵĐŚĂŐŽŽĚũŽď ?18 was clearly crucial. 
                                                          
17 The changing membership of these alliances, and the changing number of seats won by each party in them, 
is chronicled by Gulhati and Nallari in their tables 3.1 and 3.2 (pages 33 and 34) 
18 Colin Legum, as reported in Gulhati and Nallari(1990):36, note 14. 
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       To summarise, what distinguishes Mauritius, which achieved rapid diversification of 
exports and the whole economy as well as equitable growth, from our other  case studies 
which did not achieve that diversification, is the range of incentives, in particular subsidies 
on the inputs used by exporters, which were offered to exporters to complement free-
market exchange rates. In Mauritius, these input subsidies were financed by a levy on 
plantation crops, offered from the start to export-based industries, and were initiated and 
sustained by a multi-party democratic system. The Mauritian case is particularly worthy of 
note because, as we have seen in the case of both Ghana and Zambia, African multi-party 
systems have been accused of favouring intra-party rent-seeking on a scale which makes 
diversified development difficult19. In Mauritius, the process of rent-seeking was subjected 
to sufficient competitive restraint tŚĂƚŝƚĚŝĚŶŽƚŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚĞŝƚŚĞƌ ‘ůŽŶŐĞƌ-term economic 
ĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?Žƌ ?ĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞĚŝǀĞƌƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
economy. These subsidies have of course been factored into the composite variable, (real 
exchange rate* ratio of subsidies to GNP), used in Tables 3 and 4 above; but what we have 
now added to this story is the importance of the specific nature of the industries subsidised, 
and of the political process which made the targeting of subsidies on those industries 
feasible. 
 
 
 What is particularly remarkable about Mauritius is that it achieved these exploits 
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚǁŽŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŽĨƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂǀĞ historically 
been important in restraining rent-seekers and encouraging growth around the 
underdeveloped world: these are aid agencies and the civil service. Aid agencies, in 
particular the World Bank, did enter the picture in the 1960s and 1970s, but only in a small 
way (aid flows to the country never exceeded 2% of GNP);  and by the 1980s  Mauritius was 
a lower middle-income country and therefore not entitled to concessional aid flows; 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĂŶŬ ?ƐŵĂŝŶĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝon, and an important one, was, even in the middle of a 
liberalising reform programme, as discussed above, to accept ƚŚĞůŽŐŝĐŽĨDĂƵƌŝƚŝƵƐ ?
economic reform strategy on its own terms and to not interfere with its highly unorthodox 
system of export subsidy combined with import tariffs and quotas  W which in turn was based 
on pre-existing trust between the Bank and the Mauritius government20. As for the civil 
                                                          
19  Tim Kelsall (2013: 680) has ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞŐƌŽǁƚŚ is highly unlikely in African countries with an 
unrestrained form of multi-party democracy. The reason is that in current African conditions, where party 
supporters tend to be swayed more by patronage handouts than programmatic public goods, this form of 
multi-partyism introduces extremely strong incentives to focus on short-term distributive politics rather than 
longer-ƚĞƌŵĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?. 
20 The Bank, during the 1980s, did however provide two structural adjustment loans which were important in 
helping Mauritius adjust to higher budgetary and balance of payment deficits caused by shortfalls in export 
demand. It did impose some conditionality, mainly related to retrenchment in the public sector; but crucially, 
it did not significantly interfere with DĂƵƌŝƚŝƵƐ ?ƚƌĂĚĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽ
the kind of open-economy policies which the Bank was trying to press on all developing countries at the time. 
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service, there are few signs that in Mauritius (by strong contrast, for example, with 
/ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂ ?ŝƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƚŚĞŬŝŶĚŽĨ ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ƚŚĂƚ>ĞĨƚǁŝĐŚĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐƐĞĞĂƐŬĞǇ
attributes of a developmental state. Gulhati and Nallari, rather elusively, summarise the 
situation as follows: 
It is very difficult to define the precise role played by the bureaucracy in economic 
policy decisions. The core economic ministries built up some analytical capacity 
             for policy work over time, but even at the end of the 1970s there were many weak 
             ĂƌĞĂƐ ?^ŽŵĞƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ secretaries have stayed a long time in key posts and their 
             long experience has given them an inside track in policy making. In the open, 
             pluralistic environment of Mauritius, however, many economic policies are decided 
             by polling and party alignments, rather than by technocratic professional work. 
             (Gulhati and Nallari 1990:36) 
 
What this seems to mean is that, at a minimum, there was no equivalent in 
Mauritius to the power wielded over economic policy, for example, by the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning under Festus Mogae in Botswana, or the Ministry of Finance 
under Emanuel Tumusime-Mutabile in Uganda  W both of which were just as successful as 
Mauritius in terms of growth and poverty reduction, but definitely not as successful in terms 
of diversification. On this evidence, much of the technical expertise, and much of the 
restraint required to maintain pro-export policies, had to come from politicians, even from 
trade-offs between politicians; it is the more remarkable that the pattern of policy we have 
described lasted so long and so stably.  
 To summarise, we believe that fiscal policy can increase the rate of export 
diversification if, as in  Mauritius, it is driven by the needs of exporters rather than 
importers, and if subsidies focussed on exporters are combined with consistently 
competitive exchange rates. However, we have also seen that the specific nature of the 
industries subsidised is crucial, and that the political give-and-take which characterised the 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŽůĚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶĞǁ ?ĞǆƉŽƌƚ-based industries was important, and in many 
ways (certainly amongst African countries) unique. As acknowledged by  David Greenaway 
ĂŶĚŚƌŝƐDŝůŶĞƌŶĞĂƌůǇƚŚŝƌƚǇǇĞĂƌƐĂŐŽ ? ‘ƚŚŽƐĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚ
for South-South trade, on the grounds that developing countries cannot export their way to 
prosperity via the industriĂůŝƐĞĚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ŵĂǇďĞŝŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨDĂƵƌŝƚŝƵƐ ?
(Greenaway and Milner 1991: 334). 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
               Without structural transformation, prospects for long-term economic development 
are generally poor. Acknowledging this, an approach has emerged within the World Bank 
which acknowledges, like this paper, that liberalisation (especially of exchange rates) is not 
enough. This approach, centred on the work of Justin Yifu Lin, has argued that measures 
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ĂŝŵĞĚĂƚƌĞƉĂŝƌŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶĐĂƉŝƚĂůĂŶĚ
for infrastructure, may also be necessary; but has explicitly warned also that protectionism, 
of any sort, is not the way forward. 
 Our analysis suggests that this generalisation is not correct, and closes off 
possibilities for diversification which have borne fruit even in the unpromising environment 
of very poor countries. Our econometric analysis (Tables 2 and 3 above) has shown that  
controlling for human capital, overall public expenditure and GDP growth, competitiveness 
as embodied in the trend of the real exchange rate will only translate into diversification if 
accompanied by protection in the form of input subsidy. However, as our African country 
case-studies suggest, the targeting and the timing of such input subsidy is crucial. In 
Mauritius, such subsidies were temporary, lasting essentially for the decades of the eighties 
and early nineties whilst a highly unorthodox form of structural adjustment policy was 
implemented, and targeted on specific areas of manufacturing with good chances of rapidly 
penetrating global export markets, and these characteristics, together with the political 
settlement which made their implementation possible, are the key things which enabled 
that country, uniquely in Africa to date, to achieve a shift into exports of manufactures. This 
uniqueness, however, is very possibly simply an accident of history, and there is no obvious 
reason why the general approach of targeted, temporary protection, successful in Mauritius 
and the Far East, should not be replicable elsewhere. This will more readily happen if input 
subsidies of this kind are treated by the international community, as capital controls have 
recently come to be treated (IMF 2010, 2012; Ghosh and Qureshi 2016), not as just another 
disreputable form  of protectionism but as a perfectly respectable form of behaviour for 
which a developmental case can be made, particularly in the case of targeted, temporary 
protection. The evidence of this paper suggests that it is time for performance-based 
protection to emerge from the shadows and take its proper place as a potentially powerful 
tool of development policy. 
 
  
31 
 
References 
ŶĐŚĂƌĂǌ ?sŝŶĂǇĞĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘&/ĂŶĚĞǆƉŽƌƚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚ DĂƵƌŝƚŝĂŶŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? ?
unpublished paper, University of Mauritius. 
Bartz, Christina (2010) Export diversification and growth in sub-saharan Africa, DĂƐƚĞƌ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?
University of Amsterdam, Department of Economics. 
Bates, Robert(1981) Markets and States in Tropical Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Elhiraika, Adam and Michael MbaƚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚƐŽĨĞǆƉŽƌƚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚƐŝŶ
ĨƌŝĐĂ ? ?Applied Econometrics and International Development, 14, 147-161. 
Ghosh, Atish, and Mahvash S. Qureshi(2016) tŚĂƚ ?ƐŝŶĂŶĂŵĞ ?dŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĐĂůůĐĂƉŝƚĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐ ?
Washington DC: IMF Working Paper 16/25. 
Gulhati, Ravi and Raj Nallari (1990) Successful stabilisation and recovery in Mauritius, Washington 
DC: World Bank, Economic Development Institute, EDI Analytical Case Studies no. 5. 
Hirschman, Albert (1958) The Strategy of Economic Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Huria, Ankur and Paul Brenton(2015) Export diversification in Africa: the importance of good trade 
logistics, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: World Bank/Investing in Africa Forum; http:// 
document.worldbank.org/curated/en/313321467998192410/pdf/97402-REPLACEMENT-FILE-
PUBLIC-Export-Diversification-in-Africa-the-Importance-of-Good-Trade-Logistics-reviewed.pdf. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)(2010) dŚĞ&ƵŶĚ ?ƐƌŽůĞƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĐƌŽƐƐ-border capital controls, 
Washington DC: IMF Staff Position Note 10/04. 
International Monetary Fund(IMF) (2012) The liberalisation and management of capital controls :an 
institutional view. Washington DC: IMF. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2014a), Sustaining long-run growth and macro stability in low-
income countries: the role of structural transformation, Washington DC: IMF Policy Paper. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2014b), The diversification toolkit: export diversification and 
quality databases (spring 2014), Washington DC: 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/dfidimf/diversification.htm.     
Kang, David(2002) Crony capitalism: corruption and development in South Korea and the Philippines, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kelsall, Tim  ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘EĞŽ-patrimonalism, rent-ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ PŐŽŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŐƌĂŝŶ ? ? ?New 
Political Economy, 17 (November), 677-682. 
Khan, Rumman, Oliver Morrissey and Paul Mosley(2016) Two Africas: Why Africa has Barely Reduced 
Poverty since the 1980s. CREDIT discussion paper no. 16/01. 
32 
 
>ĞǁŝƐ ?t ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƵŶůŝŵŝƚĞĚƐƵƉƉůŝ ƐŽĨůĂďŽƵƌ ? ?Manchester School, 
22, 139-191. 
Lin, Justin Yifu  ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘New structural economics: a framework for rethinking development ?, World 
Bank Research Observer, 26, 193-221. 
Mbabazi, Jennifer, Chris Milner and Oliver Morrissey(2006?) Trade costs and growth: why sub-
saharan Africa performs poorly, Nottingham: CREDIT Research Paper 06/08.  
Meade, James et al.(1961) The Economic and Social Structure of Mauritius, London: Methuen. 
DĞĂĚĞ ?:ĂŵĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĞǆƉůŽƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨůŝǀŝŶŐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ?Economic 
Journal, 77, 233-255. 
DŝůŶĞƌ ?ŚƌŝƐĂŶĚĂǀŝĚ'ƌĞĞŶĂǁĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ŝĚDĂƵƌŝƚŝƵƐƌĞĂůůǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂ ‘ĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇŝŶDĂůƚŚƵƐŝĂŶ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ? ?Journal of International Development, 3, 325-338. 
DŝůŶĞƌ ?ŚƌŝƐĂŶĚWĞƚĞƌtƌŝŐŚƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DŽĚĞůůŝŶŐůĂďŽƵƌŵĂƌŬĞƚĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚƌĂĚĞůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ĂŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝƐŝŶŐĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?Economic Journal, 108, 509-528. 
Milner, Chris and Evious Ngovu (2004)  ‘tŽƵůĚĂůůW^ƵŐĂƌWƌŽƚocol exporters lose from  sugar 
ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?European Journal of Development Research 16, 790-808. 
Newman, Carol, John Page, John Rand, Mans Soderbom and Finn Tarp (2016) Made in Africa: 
Learning to Compete in Industry, Washington: Brookings Institution. 
Mosley, Paul (2017) Fiscal policy and the natural resources curse: how to escape from the poverty 
trap, London: Routledge. 
ZŽĚƌŝŬ ?ĂŶŝ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘'ŽŽĚďǇĞtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ?ŚĞůůŽtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶ ?ƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞ
tŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŐƌŽǁƚŚ ?ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐPůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĂĚĞĐĂĚĞŽĨƌĞĨŽƌŵ ? ?Journal of 
Economic Literature, 44, 973-987. 
Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul(1943 ? ‘WƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐƚĞƌŶĂŶĚƐŽƵƚŚ-ĞĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?
Economic Journal,53, 202-211. 
Subramaniam, Arvind (2009) The Mauritian success story and its lessons, Helsinki: UNU/WIDER 
Research Paper 2009/36. 
Whitfield, Lindsay, Ole Therkildsen, Lars Buur and Anne Mette Kjaer(2015) The Politics of African 
Industrial Policy: a comparative perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
World Bank(1993) The East Asian Miracle, Washington D.C. 
World Bank (2005) Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform, Washington 
DC: World Bank. 
